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Abstract 
 
The study examines the economic consequences of regulated disclosure in the banking sector, 
focusing on its impacts on the stability of banking systems.  In a cross-country study of banking 
systems across 49 countries in the 90s, I find that banking crises are less likely in countries with 
greater regulated disclosure and transparency.  Specifically, banking systems are less vulnerable 
to crisis if supported by financial reporting regimes characterized by (i) more comprehensive 
disclosure (ii) more timely financial reporting (iii) more informative reporting, and (iv) more 
credible financial disclosure. To the extent that banking crises are costly, the paper documents the 
positive impact of accounting information to the real sector of the economy. 
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Regulation of disclosure is pervasive around the world.  Surprisingly, there is little empirical 
research on the economic value of mandated disclosure, particularly in a cross-country setting. Healy and 
Palepu (2001, p. 415) notes that empirical research on disclosure regulation, in general, is ‘virtually non-
existent’.   Furthermore, the benefit of disclosure regulation, and hence greater transparency, is not 
theoretically unambiguous (e.g., Coffee, 1984). 
I document evidence on the economic consequences of greater disclosure and transparency in an 
international setting by examining the impact of bank-disclosure requirements on banking system stability 
in a large cross-section of countries.  Although banking crisis has been a common feature of banking 
systems (see, e.g., Miron (1986)), recent crises have been more frequent and severe.  There is significant 
variation in the distribution of crises across countries; some countries being frequent targets (see 
Hoggarth and Saporta, 2001).  Bank regulations, including those on disclosure and auditing, also vary 
considerably across countries (Barth et al., 2004). Moreover, banks are highly regulated business entities, 
with bank financial reports much a product of the regulatory framework in which they operate.  Thus, 
investigating banking system performance (or stability) in the context of enormous variations in national 
reporting regimes provides a fertile ground to study the economic value of regulated disclosure. 
Reflecting the broader debate on the economic consequences of regulated disclosure, the role of 
bank transparency
1 to banking-system stability is controversial.  Theory provides conflicting predictions 
about the benefits of greater transparency.  The ‘Transparency-Stability’ view holds that greater 
disclosure and the consequent transparency facilitates the efficient allocation of resources by improving 
market discipline via reducing informational asymmetry.  Increased transparency permits greater market 
discipline whereby strong banks are rewarded for their risk management and performance and weak 
banks are penalized with higher costs of raising capital and deposits, thereby enabling early detection of 
                                                 
1 I define bank transparency, following Bushman, Piotroski and Smith (2004), as “the widespread availability of 
bank-specific information concerning … banks in the economy to those outside the bank ((Bushman et al. (2004, p 
4)), and words in italic are mine). Bank transparency reflects regulated bank-level disclosure, private acquisition of 
bank-level information, and dissemination of bank information in the economy. I focus on the impact of regulated 
bank disclosure, but I also examine the role of the overall increase in transparency for completeness. 
  1weak banks before they drag the entire banking system into crisis. On the other hand, the ‘Transparency-
fragility’ view holds that greater disclosure may engender banking-system instability because it may lead 
to projection of information about problems of specific banks as indicator of widespread problems in the 
banking system, thereby leading to bank-runs or stock market collapse (Calomiris and Mason, 1997; 
Gilbert and Vaughan, 1998; and Kaufman, 1994).  That is, disclosure creates negative externalities. 
Disclosure of financial problems at a bank level may lead to the bank’s failure through a bank run.  It may 
also lead to an overreaction in the financial markets, jeopardizing the ability of the bank to raise capital.  
This lack of investor confidence could spread to the entire banking system, causing systemic banking 
failure.   In that case, rather than providing market discipline to improve resource allocation, more 
disclosure and transparency leads to the collapse of the banking system, causing in failure of both strong 
and weak banks alike. 
The paper studies the impact of disclosure regulations meant to increase bank transparency on the 
likelihood of suffering a systemic banking crisis
2 based on data on banking crisis incidence and disclosure 
regulations across 49 countries over the period of 1990 and 1997.  Using the conceptual framework 
advanced in Bushman, Piotroski and Smith (2004), it examines the impacts on banking crisis probability 
of disclosure regulations meant to increase bank disclosure quality, including the intensity, 
informativeness, timeliness, and credibility of bank disclosures. It also explores the impact of overall 
bank transparency, which reflects the disclosure regulations meant to increase the quality of bank reports 
as well as the degree of private acquisition of information, and dissemination of bank information.  
To draw accurate inferences about the impact of bank-transparency on bank crisis, I control for a 
number of factors that may influence banking fragility.  These include macro economic sources of bank 
                                                 
2 I use banking crisis to mean systemic banking crisis.  Instability in the banking system may refer to both individual 
bank failures and banking system crises.  The former refers to a failure of a financial institution, and the latter 
describes the situation where a failure of an individual financial institution leads to many simultaneous failures of 
other financial institutions. This is different from ‘contagion’ where an individual failure leads to ‘one or more 
sequential failures’.  Banking crisis could be ‘systemic’ or borderline.  ‘Systemic’ banking crises are episodes of 
crises where most or all bank capital in the system is exhausted.  I provide the detailed criteria by which I classify 
banking crisis in section 3 below. 
 
  2instability, such as the level of inflation and external terms of trade, and cross-country differences in the 
banking industry structure such as the degree of bank competition, bank concentration, and regulations on 
bank entry, activity and ownership. I also control for differences in the overall institutional quality, as 
well as differences in the macro economic environment of banks as reflected in the level of economic 
development.  
I find that disclosure regulation fosters banking system stability.  Specifically, banking systems 
are more likely to be stable in countries with regulations that require more comprehensive, more 
informative, more timely and more credible disclosure.  I report that greater bank transparency, in 
general, lowers the likelihood of systemic banking crisis, controlling for the effects of macroeconomic 
sources of instability and banking market structure. The positive impact of greater disclosure on the real 
sector of the economy via enhancing banking-system stability is also economically large.  Based on 
historical data on the costs of banking crisis, the impact of enhanced disclosure and transparency could 
amount to a saving as high as 1.7 percent of GDP per crisis episode. 
The paper is related to three distinct areas of accounting and economic research.  First, it 
contributes to the limited empirical research
3 on the economics of regulated disclosure (see Healy and 
Palepu (2001) for a recent survey).  The few studies in this area (Stigler, 1964; Benston, 1969; and, 
Benston, 1973) investigate the economic impacts of the Security Acts of 1933 and 1934 in the U.S., 
finding no significant value to investors. Others challenge these findings (see Coffee, 1984), including 
Bushee and Leuz (2003) who find some evidence of economic benefits to SEC disclosure regulation. This 
paper provides evidence to the debate by documenting the economic value of regulation of disclosure in 
preventing banking crisis.   
                                                 
3 The mandated disclosure literature traditionally attempts to compare disclosure under regulated environments against disclosure 
in unregulated environments.  I make the comparisons across environments that are more or less regulated. The cross-country 
setting of the research design allows me to make such comparisons.  Note also that there is a large literature on the economic 
impacts of mandated changes in accounting standards (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Fields, et al., 2001), which, along with 
capital-markets research (see Kothari, 2001), and voluntary disclosure research (see, Cole, 2001), focuses on the relation between 
reported accounting numbers and stock returns. While the focus of these groups of studies is on either (a) the capital market 
effects of changes in accounting methods, or (b) the effects of changes in corporate disclosure within the context of the same 
disclosure-regulatory regime (usually the U.S.), this paper examines the impact of variations in disclosure regulations themselves 
across a wide range of countries. 
  3Second, the paper is related to the growing literature on the role of financial information in 
corporate governance. In a recent paper on accounting information and governance, Bushman and Smith 
(2001) provide a roadmap of future research agenda that includes investigation of the role of accounting 
information in influencing real economic performance. They suggest cross-country design as the most 
powerful setting for this type of research. Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2004) provide a framework for 
conceptualizing and measuring corporate transparency.  This paper investigates the consequence in terms 
of bank performance and crisis probability of banking system transparency (in the context of Bushman et 
al. (2004)), but with a focus on the component of transparency that is attributable to regulated disclosure. 
By so doing, it documents the economic value of accounting information.   
As a cross-country study, the paper is related to prior international studies on financial reporting 
such as on disclosure regulation, enforcement and disclosure intensity (e.g., Jaggi and Low, 2000; Hope, 
2003); the value-relevance of earnings (e.g., Alford et al., 1993; Francis et al., 2003; Geunther and 
Young, 2000; Land and Lang, 2003); earnings management (e.g., Bhattacharya et al., 2003; Leuz et al., 
2003); earnings timeliness (e.g., Ball et al., 2000); audit quality (e.g., Francis et al., 2003); and analyst 
activity (e.g., Bushman et al., 2005).  While this literature explores, to the most part, the determinants of 
some dimension of firms’ information environment (or corporate transparency), this paper goes beyond 
by investigating the impact of transparency on economic performance (i.e., banking fragility).  
Third, in the banking literature, the paper contributes to the growing empirical literature on 
banking crises. Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2005) and Beck et al. (2005) investigate 
macroeconomic factors and banking market structure as determinants of banking crisis. Cull, Senbet and 
Sorge (2005) and Demriguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2004) examine the relations between deposit 
insurance design features and banking crises.  Barth, Caprio and Levine (2004) examine the relation 
between bank regulation and banking crisis. Yet this literature does not address the role of disclosure and 
transparency on banking crisis.  Baumann and Nier (2004) recently examine the relation between bank-
level disclosure, and firm performance in terms of stock price volatility. In contrast, this paper 
investigates the role of disclosure regulation in preventing systemic banking crises. 
  4The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides the theoretical discussions on 
the relation between regulated disclosure and crisis, developing testable hypotheses. Section 3 provides a 
detailed description of the data and methodology. Section 4 presents the results, and Section 5 concludes 
the paper. 
2.  Disclosure Regulations and Banking System Stability: Theory 
 
In the general regulation theory, public regulation is justified by market failure that can result 
from (i) the presence of market power, (ii) the importance of externalities, or (iii) asymmetric 
information. Applying this general theory, disclosure regulation is usually associated with informational 
asymmetry or some form of externality (see, e.g., Healy and Palepu, 2001). 
Informational asymmetry leads to adverse selection between savers and entrepreneurs, causing 
misallocation of capital. Entrepreneurs have better information about, and incentive to inflate the value of 
their investment opportunities.  In the context of banking, a large literature attributes the problems of bank 
runs and bank panics to informational asymmetry (see Bryant, 1980; Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; 
Minkew, 1986; and Bernanke and Gertler, 1990). Informational asymmetry between a bank and its 
depositors could precipitate a bank run, hastening the bank’s failure. This is when a bank is subject to 
excessive withdrawals by uninformed depositors due to fear of real or imagined impending bank failure. 
A bank run may then spread to other banks, again because of informational asymmetry, endangering the 
stability of the banking system.   
One well-known solution to the problem of asymmetry is regulated disclosure.  Others include 
optimal contracting and the use of information intermediaries (see Healy and Palepu, 2001).  Leftwich, 
(1980) and Watts and Zimmerman (1986) suggest that, by creating minimum disclosure requirements, 
regulation of disclosure reduces the informational gap between the ‘informed’ and ‘uninformed’ agents in 
the economy.   
Externalities provide a second justification for regulated disclosure.  Leftwich (1980) and Watts 
and Zimmerman (1986) argue that accounting information can be viewed as a public good, subject to the 
  5free-rider problem. Existing shareholders pay for its production but cannot charge prospective investors 
for its use. The resulting imbalance between private and public value of information leads to its 
underproduction, necessitating mandatory disclosure.   
Other externalities have also been discussed in the literature. For example, information generated 
by one firm could confer benefits to others who did not pay for its production in the form of liquidity 
spillovers (Dye, 1990; Admati and Pfleiderer, 2000).  Disclosure can also generate negative informational 
externalities. Fishman and Hagerty (1989) note that, due to information costs, investors may be able to 
analyze only few firms. They show that greater disclosure, in that case, may lead to lower price efficiency 
by attracting investors away from other firms.  
Negative externalities are a particularly acute concern in the banking sector. The failure of a bank 
could spread to other banks (or firms) that are linked to the failing bank, in addition to the externalities it 
creates to its depositors.  Bank runs and generalized bank panic (or crisis), due to these externalities, were 
commonplace and their history is as long as that of the modern banking system (see, e.g., Miron (1986))
4.  
In fact, bank regulation (not just only in areas of disclosure) has evolved to contain these externalities.   
Informationally, greater disclosure may generate negative externalities in banking. Disclosure 
may lead to interpretation of specific information about banks’ financial conditions as indication of 
widespread problems in the banking system, leading to bank runs or stock market collapse (Calomiris and 
Mason, 1997; Gilbert and Vaughan, 1998; and Kaufman, 1994).  Disclosure of financial problems at a 
bank may lead to the bank’s failure through a bank run and may cause an overreaction in the financial 
markets.  The lack of investor confidence could spread to the entire banking system causing banking 
panic, suggesting that greater disclosure may foster banking system instability. 
  Thus the impacts of regulated disclosure on banking system stability are intricately complex.  On 
the one hand, the informational asymmetry and the positive externality explanations of regulated 
                                                 
4 The U.S. experienced eleven banking panics between 1800 and 1900 (Baim and Calomaris, 2001). Miron (1986) provides an 
impressive account of bank panics in the U.S. For example, the probability of a bank panic in a given year during the period 1890 
through 1908 is estimated to be one in three.  The average annual real growth rate in those periods would have been 3 percent 
higher in the absence of banking panic. 
  6disclosure predict that disclosure and the consequent transparency enhances banking system stability by 
enabling market participants to better assess bank risk and performance.  This is the “Transparency-
Stability’ view.  On the other hand, regulated disclosure could exasperate banking system instability by 
creating negative informational externalities.  This is what I call the ‘Transparency-Fragility” view.  If the 
“Transparency-Stability” view holds, we should find that increased regulated disclosure reduces the 
likelihood of banking system crises, controlling for other sources of banking system instability.  If the 
alternative view is true, we should observe a positive relation between banking crisis probability and 
regulated disclosure on average. The disclosure-stability relation is, therefore, a matter of empirical 
question, which I investigate in the sections to follow.  
3. Data  and  Methodology 
  A. Methodology 
  I examine the relation between bank transparency and banking system stability using a 
multivariate logit model.  I estimate the probability that a systemic banking crisis will occur in a particular 
country in a particular time, assuming this probability is a function of a set of explanatory variables of 
interest, X, and control variables, Z.  Let Crisisit be an indicator variable that takes 1 when country i is in a 
systemic banking crisis in year t, and 0 otherwise. Let Pit be the probability (conditional) that systemic 
crisis occurs in country i in period t.  The natural log of this likelihood of crisis given the explanatory 
variables, where β and λ are vectors of parameters to be estimated and F(Xitβ;Zitλ) is the cumulative 
logistic function evaluated at (Xitβ;Zitλ), is given by, 
() )) ; ( 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ; ( (
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where, X is a vector of variables of interest and includes variables representing bank transparency 
including regulated disclosure, and Z is a set of control variables that include variables representing the 
banking industry structure, the quality of overall institutions and the macro economic environment of 
countries.  
  7  In modeling the likelihood of crisis, I use the logistic function as the underlying probability 
distribution
5.  This conforms to earlier studies of banking crises (see, e.g., Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2005; 
Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2004).  In this logit specification, the estimates of the coefficients β and λ do not 
represent a marginal effect on the likelihood of crisis for a unit change in the underlying independent 
variable.  Rather, the coefficients measure an increase in the natural log of the odds ratio, ln[Pit/(1-Pit)], 
and this quantity depends on the  values of the independent variables at which the likelihood is evaluated.  
A change in the independent variables will have different (i.e., nonlinear) effects on the likelihood of 
crisis depending on the initial crisis probability. 
  In the main regressions, I define each year for a country as either a crisis year or a non-crisis year, 
and examine the relation between crisis probability in an average year and country transparency. Each 
country is included eight times (1990 through 1997) in a pooled time-series cross section. Such a 
specification may introduce a problem of correlated errors (or lack of independence) because crisis 
episodes may be correlated across years for a country and/or across countries.  I address these 
methodological issues in the robustness section below in a number of ways, including redefining the crisis 
event as a single event for a country, specifying the model as a panel with random effects, and estimating 
it as a cross-country regression. 
  B. Variables 
 
  Crisis, the dependent variable, is an indicator variable that takes 1 if a country has undergone 
systemic banking crisis in a particular year during the period 1990 through 1997.  I construct the variable 
primarily based on the database of World Bank dataset on Financial crisis (see World Bank (2003)), 
which provides comprehensive information on episodes of banking crisis since the 1970s for a large 
sample of countries.  I supplement this information with data in Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2005), 
particularly in dating the episodes.  Systemic crises are, in general, episodes in which most or all bank 
                                                 
5 I also use a probit model for robustness. No discernable differences were shown between the two sets of estimates. On 
theoretical ground, there is no basis to prefer logit to probit and vise versa; they both are widely used in empirical economic 
research. 
  8capital in the banking system is exhausted.  Consistent with previous research (Barth et al., 2004; 
Demirguc-Kunt, 2005), episodes are considered systemic if non-performing assets account for more than 
10% of total assets, or rescue costs amount to more than 2% of GDP, or the crisis involved large-scale 
nationalizations, or the crisis involved bank runs where emergency measures were taken. I identify 21 
such episodes in the 1990s.  I focus on the 1990s because I have data on disclosure and transparency – my 
independent variables – only for this period.   
  I use, as vector X, various measures of bank-transparency, including regulated-disclosure, with a 
set of control variables (the vector Z), to explain incidence of systemic banking crises (Crisis).  The focal 
explanatory variables – the measures of bank-transparency – are constructed using cross-country data on 
bank regulatory provisions that regulate local disclosure practices by banks.  The data is obtained from a 
recent database on bank supervision and regulation maintained by the World Bank (Barth et al., 2001). 
The database is constructed based on surveys of national bank regulatory and supervisory authorities in 
1998 and 1999.  The data from the survey have been extensively used in recent bank regulation studies 
(e.g., Barth et al., 2004; Beck et al., 2003; Cull et al., 2005; Cleassens and Laeven, 2004; and Demirguc-
Kunt, and Detragiache, 2004). I utilize the survey responses on questions related to disclosure and 
auditing to construct the relevant indices of bank-transparency.   
I use the framework of Bushman, Smith and Piotroski (2004) to identify and organize the 
properties of regulated disclosure relevant to enhancing transparency. Regulated disclosure enriches the 
informational environment of the reporting firm.  Bushman et al. (2004)] provide a framework for 
conceptualizing the informational environment of the firm.  They identify three components of corporate 
transparency: the quality of corporate reporting, the degree of private information acquisition (e.g., by 
analysts), and the availability of information-dissemination infrastructure (e.g., well- developed media). 
The quality of corporate reporting is the foundation of transparency, and is, to the most part, a function of 
regulated disclosure.  Bushman et al. (2004) further identify four properties of corporate reporting quality: 
disclosure intensity (or comprehensiveness), disclosure informativeness, disclosure timeliness and 
disclosure credibility. Figure 1 summarizes the Bushman et al. (2004) framework.  
  9 To operationalize these conceptual constructs, Bushman et al. (2004) use measures of realized 
disclosure practices, namely disclosure rankings from the Center for International Financial Accounting 
Research (CIFAR).  Instead, because my focus is on regulated disclosure, I operationalize the variables in 
terms of the corresponding regulatory provisions related to each conceptual construct. The measurement 
of the key constructs (i.e., the independent variables), using regulatory disclosure provisions, is as 
follows.  
Disclosure Intensity measures the extent and comprehensiveness of financial reporting required 
of banks. Based on the survey responses, it specifically measures whether bank financial reports include 
information on bank risk management practices, accurately presents non-performing loans, provides a full 
picture of bank activity by reporting consolidated financial statements, and presents comprehensive 
information by reporting off-balance sheet transactions.  The variable is constructed as a principal 
component of the following indicator variables:  (i) a variable that takes the value 1 if banks are required 
to disclose risk management procedures to the public; (ii) a variable that takes 1 if the disclosure 
regulation requires that accrued income on non-performing loans (NPL) should not be reported in the 
bank’s income statement; (iii) a variable that assumes 1 if consolidated financial statements of bank and 
non-bank financial subsidiaries are required; and  (iv) a variable that takes 1 if off balance sheet items 
need to be disclosed to the public. These variables are a 0 or 1 indicator variables, and a value 1 
represents good disclosure practice with respect to the disclosure item the variable denotes. The source of 
this data is the World Bank survey of bank regulation and supervision described in Barth et al. (2001). 
Non-reporting of income on NPL provides a more accurate representation of the financial health 
of the bank; consolidated financial statements are considered to be comprehensive; reporting off-balance 
sheet transactions provides a more complete picture of the conditions of the bank; and reporting risk 
management procedures enable investors to assess the risk profile and valuation of the bank better.  
Hence, these variables quantify good disclosure practices in terms of enhancing disclosure 
comprehensiveness.  To the extent that increased disclosure results in greater transparency and the 
consequent market discipline, the variable Disclosure Intensity will be associated with lower rate of bank 
  10fragility.  If, on the other hand, increased disclosure causes misinterpretation and panic, the variable could 
be associated with greater fragility. 
Disclosure Informativeness measures the degree to which bank disclosure accurately represents 
the financial conditions of banks. For example, reporting interest income from non-performing loans as 
part of bank income overstates the true economic performance of the bank, as does the selective reporting 
of bank activities.  Disclosure Informativeness is measured by aggregating whether non-performing 
loans are accurately presented and whether banks are required to present their bank and non-bank 
activities in a consolidated financial statement. 
Disclosure Timeliness measures the degree to which bank disclosure is close to the decision 
time-point of potential users of the information.  This is a function of the frequency with which 
information is available to users.  Using survey data of accounting reporting practices around the world 
by CIFAR, Bushman et al. (2004) construct an index of the average frequency and comprehensiveness of 
interim reports for a sample of 60 countries. The frequency of interim reports as reported by CIFAR is a 
matter of country’s disclosure regulation (see CIFAR, 1995).   I use this index as a proxy for disclosure 
timeliness.   
Disclosure Credibility measures the degree to which bank-generated disclosure is subject to 
verification by an external audit that is independent, professional and rigorous as reflected by the 
regulations that govern bank-auditing practices.  Specifically, it measures the stringency of external audit 
in terms of whether external audit is compulsory, whether the scope of external audit is mandated, 
whether there is a license requirement for auditors, and whether auditors have independence in reporting 
to supervisory bodies.  The variable is a principal component of the following five indicator variables: (i) 
a variable that takes 1 if external audit of banks is compulsory in the country. (Such audit is compulsory 
in all countries with the exception of China, Italy and Taiwan); (ii) a variable that takes a value of 1 if 
there are specific regulatory requirements for the extent of audit;  (To the extent that audits are costly, in 
the absence of minimum requirements, audit services could be undersupplied.  Hence, the presence of 
such regulation improves audit services.);  (iii) a variable that takes 1 if auditors are required to be 
  11licensed or certified; (iv) an variable that takes 1 if auditors’ report should be given to supervisory 
agency; and, (v) a variable that takes 1 if supervisors can meet external auditors to discuss audit report 
without bank approval.  
Quality third-party audits provide validation that bank-produced financial statements represent 
the financial condition of the bank as is, thereby increasing the credibility of the bank disclosure.  To the 
extent that this enhances the ability of market participants to accurately assess the risk profile of the bank, 
and strengthen market discipline, increases in these variables would be associated with lower rates of 
crisis. 
Regulated-Disclosure Quality is a measure of the effectiveness of the disclosure regulations in 
enhancing the quality of bank reports.  It reflects the effectiveness of disclosure regulations in enhancing 
the comprehensiveness, informativeness, timeliness and credibility of financial reports, and, as a 
construct, it corresponds to Bushman et al. (2004)’s concept of corporate reporting quality.  The variable 
is constructed as a principal component of the variables disclosure intensity, disclosure informativeness, 
disclosure timeliness and disclosure credibility. 
Tables 1 through 3 provide a summary of these variables.  Regulated-Disclosure Quality exhibits 
a wide variation across countries ranging in value between -2.99 (Kenya) and 1.259 (Canada). Countries 
high on regulated-disclosure quality tend to have lower incidence of crisis. Countries that have 
experienced crisis in the 90s score lower on regulated-disclosure quality and disclosure intensity, 
timeliness and credibility (see Table 2). Regulated-Disclosure Quality is negatively correlated with 
incidence of banking crisis (though the relation is not statistically significant) in Table 3.  The same is 
true of the relations between incidence of crisis and the variables disclosure intensity, disclosure 
informativeness, disclosure timeliness and disclosure credibility.  These variables also exhibit wide 
variations across countries. For example, disclosure intensity ranges in value from -1.917 (Ghana and 
Guatemala) to 1.342 (e.g., the U.K and Switzerland). Disclosure credibility varies from -6.725 (Italy) to 
0.554 (e.g., the U.S. and Switzerland).  Italy scores the lowest because, out of the five measures that 
constitute external audit stringency, Italy’s bank regulation requires only one which is the requirement 
  12that auditors should be licensed. The other country with low score, Japan, provides two requirements – 
bank audit is compulsory and that auditors should be licensed. 
Private Information Acquisition measures the degree of private information processing and 
gathering activity by investors (or on behalf of investors) other than the reporting bank.  I use the average 
number of analyst-following per bank in a country as a proxy for the amount of private information 
acquisition. It is the sum of analysts (following) each bank in the country divided by the number 
of banks. Note that we are interested in measuring the information environment of banks (not 
firms).  Hence, the measure of private information acquisition using analyst following, is 
calculated as analyst followings of banks.  
Information dissemination, following Bushman et al. (2004), measures firm-specific information 
dissemination by the degree of penetration of the media channels in the economy. The variable is the 
average rank of countries’ per capita number of newspapers and televisions as reported by World 
Development indicators obtained from Bushman et al. (2004). 
Bank Transparency represents the availability of bank-specific information to economic agents 
outside the bank, and reflects (i) the quality of reporting that includes the intensity, informativeness, 
timeliness and credibility of disclosure, (ii) the degree of private acquisition of information, and (iii) the 
degree of information dissemination.  It is measured as a principal component of the variables Regulated-
Disclosure Quality, Private Information Acquisition and Information Dissemination. 
Tables 1 through 3 provide a summary of these variables. The variables exhibit enormous 
variability across countries. For example, bank transparency ranges from –2.522 (Kenya) to 1.48 (U.S.) 
(Table 2).  Information dissemination ranges in value between 23.05 and 96.72, reflecting the unequal 
development of communication infrastructure in our sample of countries. Countries high on bank 
transparency, regulated-disclosure quality and information dissemination tend to also have lower 
incidence of banking crisis (see Table 2).  In Table 3, bank transparency and crisis exhibit significant 
negative correlation, as does information dissemination and crisis.  Also, the quality of regulated 
  13disclosure reinforces the degree of information acquisition, and the quality of information dissemination 
in increasing the overall information environment in the country.  They tend to be complements rather 
than substitutes. 
Control Variables: To examine the relations between bank transparency and banking crises, I 
control for a number of factors.  To control for macroeconomic (in) stability that are likely to affect the 
quality of bank assets thereby crisis probability, I use the average rate of inflation and the external terms 
of trade. This is consistent with previous research (e.g., Barth et al., 2004; Cull et al., 2005). Inflation 
serves as a proxy for macroeconomic mismanagement that adversely affects the economy and the banking 
system. A chronically inflationary environment deteriorates the quality of bank assets and I expect 
inflation to increase banking crisis probability.  External terms-of-trade captures the macro economic 
shocks that could adversely affect banks by increasing their non-performing loans.  Improvements in 
terms-of-trade are expected to be associated with decreases in the likelihood of banking crises. Per capita 
GDP is included to control for the level of development of the country, and serves as a proxy for the 
quality of the overall institutional environment. Banking sector problems could result from weaknesses in 
the legal system that permeates widespread fraud, and/or weaknesses in the administrative capacity that is 
reflected in loose prudential supervision and regulation of the banking system. Per capita GDP is expected 
to measure differences across countries on these dimensions. 
Recent research identifies banking industry structure as a potential determinant of banking crises.  
Beck et al. (2005) report that banking crisis is lower in countries with concentrated banking system and 
both Beck et al. (2003) and Barth et al. (2004) find that countries with banking industry structure that 
allows more competition and less regulatory restrictions have lower incidence of bank crises.  I use bank 
concentration, the share of assets of the three largest banks, to control for banking system concentration. 
I expect concentrated banking to be associated with less likelihood of crisis – a negative coefficient.  To 
control for the degree of competition in the banking sector, I use a variable, bank competition, which is a 
measure of banking competitiveness conduct obtained from Claessens and Laeven (2004).  Using a 
methodology from Panzar and Rosse (1987), Claessens and Laeven (2004) develop an index of 
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elasticity of bank revenue to changes in input prices.  The variable, bank competition, takes values 
between 1 (perfect competition) and 0 (monopoly), with less than 1 representing monopolistic 
competition. Claessens and Laeven (2004) find that banking systems with less entry restrictions, less 
restriction to foreign bank entry and less restriction as to what activities banks can get into are more 
competitive, but find no inverse relation between competitiveness and concentration.  Barth et al. (2004) 
and Beck et al. (2005) report an inverse relation between restrictive regulations against entry and activity, 
and banking crisis.  I expect greater bank competition in the banking system to be associated with a lower 
likelihood of banking crisis.  I also use banking entry restrictions (the number of new bank applicants for 
bank license denied), and regulatory restrictions on banking activity from Barth et al. (2004) as alternative 
measures of bank competition, and find similar results. 
Table 1 summarizes the variables. The data displays significant variations in the macroeconomic 
conditions and banking industry structure.  Average log of inflation ranges from 0.01 to 0.46 and, 
consistent with priors, is positively correlated with incidence of crisis (Table 2). Bank concentration 
ranges from a low of 19 percent to a high of 100 percent, while the measure of bank competition ranges 
between 0.41 and 0.92, indicating monopolistic competition as the dominant market structure of banking 
systems around the world. Consistent with prior research, bank competition tends to be associated with 
lower incidence of crisis (Table 2).  Developed countries, in general, appear to be less vulnerable to crisis.  
Per capita GDP has a negative correlation with banking crisis. Developed countries also tend to have 
better informational environments, reflecting the better quality of informational, supervisory and 
regulatory institutions.  This is shown in the high level of correlations between per capita GDP and the 
informational variables. 
C. Sample  Selection 
  I attempt to explain the likelihood of suffering from banking crisis given information on the 
regulatory environment governing bank disclosure in different countries.  The data on regulation of 
disclosure, from the World Bank, is based on surveys of bank supervisory bodies in the late 90s.  Though 
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over time, it is reasonable to assume that the survey results reflect the period closest to when the survey 
was taken more accurately than the distant past. Hence, due to these data limitations, and to minimize the 
problem of reverse causality, I focus on explaining incidence of banking crisis in the 90s (1990 through 
1997).  For this period, I cover all countries with data on bank regulation and supervision and data on 
crises as my sample.  This results in a sample size of 49 countries with 21 episodes of crises (not counting 
the length of time of each crisis) involving 20 countries. The total number of crisis years is 67 out of the 
total number of 392 panel observations. Appendix I presents the list of countries in the sample and the 
episodes of crisis in the 1990s. 
  As noted, we have data limitation where the transparency variables are drawn from the period 
after when we observe the countries’ crises experiences.  The survey data on which the transparency 
measures are based is simply not available before 1997.  This may raise a concern that the transparency 
data would reflect the banks’ responses to crises episodes, hence introducing reverse causality. We would 
expect a country to improve its disclosure practices in response to major episode of crises.  One can 
effectively address, and I do in the robustness section below, the reverse causality issue through 
instrumental variables approach, where I examine the relation between the exogenous component of 
transparency – i.e., that part of transparency explainable by exogenous instruments (such as differences in 
legal origin of countries) – and crisis probability, the dependent variable. In addition, if it is true that a 
country improves its disclosure after a crisis episode, one would expect, on average, an occurrence of 
banking crisis to be followed by improvements in disclosure and transparency – i.e., a positive relation 
between crisis probability and transparency. The effect of this data problem would, therefore, be to bias 
the results in favor of the ‘Transparency-Fragility’ hypothesis, and against the ‘Transparency-Stability’ 
thesis. Hence, in the case of a finding of positive relation between crisis probability and disclosure, 
caution should be exercised in interpreting the results. However, once causality is accounted for, a finding 
of negative relation would be a strong evidence for the ‘Transparency-Stability’ view, given the presumed 
‘bias’ in the data. 
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observed in 1997 as a proxy for variations in the disclosure climate during the sample period. That is, it is 
assumed that, while there is cross-country variation, the relative rankings of the countries in their level of 
transparency remains stable over this short period of time. Barth et al. (2004), for example, reports that 
the regulatory and supervisory environment of which bank disclosure is a consequence does not change 
significantly over time. Table 3, also provides evidence consistent with this assumption. Despite the fact 
that the crises countries presumably may have improved their transparency, as a group, these countries 
score significantly lower than the non-crises countries in all measures of transparency.  
III. Results 
I begin the discussion in this section by examining the relation between overall bank transparency 
(which reflects the effects of regulated disclosure) and banking system-stability. I will then focus on the 
role of regulated-disclosure – the focal variable of interest – in subsection B below, with a detailed 
exploration of the role of its components: disclosure intensity, disclosure informativeness, disclosure 
timeliness and disclosure credibility.  
  A.  Bank Transparency and Banking Crises 
  
Table 4 indicates that greater overall Bank Transparency, which reflects regulated disclosure as 
well as the degree of private information acquisition and dissemination, reduces the likelihood of 
suffering a systemic banking crisis.  Bank Transparency enters the empirical models with a large 
statistically significant negative sign.  The inverse relation between bank transparency and banking 
fragility holds controlling for macroeconomic sources of instability as well as banking industry structure.  
In column (2), transparency is associated with a lower likelihood of systemic banking crisis, controlling 
for macroeconomic sources of bank instability such as inflation and external terms-of trade.  Columns (3) 
and (4) indicate that transparency lowers the likelihood of banking crisis controlling for banking industry 
structure, where the latter is measured by the degree of bank concentration combined with regulatory 
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where bank system competition is measured by a broader measure of competition from Claessens and 
Laeven (2004). The result holds in columns (6) through (8) where I account for both macro-economic 
factors and banking industry structure.  Finally, transparency lowers crisis probability controlling for the 
level of economic development of countries, as a proxy for the overall institutional quality in column (9).  
The results in Table 4 broadly support the thesis that greater transparency, reflecting the degree of 
regulated disclosure, enhances bank system stability via strengthening market discipline. The impact of 
greater transparency to bank stability is also economically large. To illustrate, based on the complete 
model estimates in column (8), increasing bank transparency by one standard deviation would lower the 
likelihood of banking crisis by about 11 percent
6.  This is a significant reduction, given that crisis 
probabilities are very low at any point in time.  Hoggarth and Saport (2001) report the cumulative output 
loss of the average banking crisis to be about 17 percent of GDP.  Applying the crisis-ameliorating 
probabilities, the impact of greater transparency would be a saving of roughly 1.8 percent of GDP. 
With respect to the control variables, confirming economic theory and previous empirical results, 
improvements in external terms-of-trade reduces crisis probability, while uncontrolled inflation increases 
probability of banking crisis. As predicted, bank concentration lowers bank crisis probability, confirming 
the results in Beck et al. (2005).  Confirming priors, a banking crisis is less likely in more competitive 
banking systems.  This is consistent with earlier findings (Barth et al., 2004) and Beck et al., 2005) that 
regulatory restrictions in the areas of entry and banking activity foster bank fragility. It is also confirmed 
by the direct evidence that increased competitive conduct (or competitiveness) lowers the likelihood of 
banking crisis which is a new finding in this paper. More developed economies are less likely to suffer 
systemic banking crisis, indicating the positive role of the overall quality of the institutional environment.  
In general, the models fit the data well, generating an in-sample correct prediction of crises episodes up to 
                                                 
6 Noting that the predicted value from the model provides an estimate for Ln(pit/(1+pit),  increasing bank 
transparency by one standard deviation (i.e. 1), holding the other variables at their mean levels, increases 
Ln(pit/(1+pit) by -2.137 (i.e. -2.137 X1).  Solving for pit, the probability that banking crisis would occur in country i 
during period t, pit = e
-2.137/(1+e
-2.137), which is equal to 0.1056.  
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the models are developed, and in no way speaks of their out-of-sample performance. 
B.  Regulated Disclosure Quality, Private Information Acquisition, 
Information Dissemination and Banking Crises 
 
Bank transparency consists of regulated-disclosure quality, information acquisition, and the 
degree of information dissemination (see Figure 1).  Table 5 explores the transparency-stability link 
further by focusing on the relation between stability and these components of transparency, with a 
particular focus on the role of regulated disclosure.  The table indicates that regulated-disclosure quality 
(Panel A) and the quality of information dissemination (Panel B) reduce the likelihood of systemic 
banking crisis; whereas private information acquisition (Panel B) has little role in enhancing banking 
stability.  
Results in column (1) indicate that, controlling for macro-economic sources of instability, the 
likelihood of banking crisis is lower in countries with greater regulated disclosure quality. Column (2) 
indicates that, controlling for banking market structure, banking systems with higher regulated disclosure 
requirements are less vulnerable to crisis.  The inverse relation between regulated disclosure and banking 
system crisis holds in column (3), where I account for both sets of control. Regulated disclosure lowers 
crisis probability also after controlling for the level of economic development of countries, as a proxy for 
the overall institutional quality in column (4).   
Panel C indicates that the breadth of information dissemination capability in the country, 
measured by the degree of media penetration in the economy, has a significant positive impact in 
fostering banking system stability. In contrast, private information acquisition activities (Panel B) have 
negligible role to banking stability. 
The results also indicate that the control variables act as predicted. The overall effects of bank 
concentration and bank competition on crisis likelihood are still negative and significant.  External terms-
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the data well, correctly identifying episodes of crises, within the sample, up to 95% of the time. 
The results are consistent with the hypothesis that regulated disclosure enhances the stability of a 
banking system by facilitating market discipline to work via reducing informational asymmetry. The 
marginal effect of regulated disclosure is also economically meaningful. To provide an idea of the 
magnitude of this effect, based on the estimates in column (4), we see that an increase in regulated 
disclosure quality by one standard deviation lowers the likelihood of banking crisis by about 5 percent, 
which translates into a saving, on average, of about 1 percent of GDP per banking crisis episode.   
C. Regulated  Disclosure  and  Banking Crises: A Closer Look 
 
  Regulated disclosure quality, the focal variable of interest, aggregates the provisions of national 
banking regulations meant to regulate the comprehensiveness, informativeness, timeliness and credibility 
of bank generated information.  To investigate the impact of regulated disclosure on stability further, 
Table 6 presents the empirical relations between the components of disclosure quality – disclosure 
intensity, disclosure informativeness, disclosure timeliness, and disclosure credibility – and crisis 
probability.  
  The table clearly indicates that the likelihood of systemic banking crisis is lower in countries with 
disclosure regulations that require more comprehensive, more informative, more timely, and more 
credible bank disclosure.  Disclosure intensity, the measure of the comprehensiveness of disclosure as 
required by regulation, is inversely related to crisis probability, and its coefficient is statistically large 
(column (1)). This is so after controlling for both macroeconomic sources of instability and bank industry 
structure.  The more informative regulatory disclosure is, the less vulnerable the banking system to crisis 
(column (2)).  The more timely regulated disclosure, the less is the likelihood of systemic banking crisis 
(column (3)).  Finally, banking crisis is lower in countries with credible financial reporting as measured 
by the stringency of external-audit practices across countries. 
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fosters banking system stability via market discipline. While regulated disclosure and its components are 
positively related to banking system stability, there is no evidence that it fosters banking crisis.  In 
addition, regulation of disclosure appears to enhance stability by ensuring availability of ‘useful’ financial 
information – information that is comprehensive, informative, timely, and credible.   
I measure disclosure credibility by the degree of the stringency of external-audit as required by 
disclosure regulations. I find that this measure is associated with lower likelihood of banking crisis. 
Disclosure credibility is also negatively related to crisis probability controlling for disclosure intensity 
(not reported) indicating that stringent auditing is not a mere substitute for accurate and comprehensive 
disclosure. Rather, regulations that call for more vigilant external audit complement greater disclosure in 
fostering banking system stability. The finding is consistent with the notion that external audit adds value 
to market discipline by providing third-party verification of information that banks are reluctant to release 
to the public voluntarily.  In their loan decisions, banks collect private information from their customers.  
Banks are reluctant to disclose proprietary information about their customers, making it difficult for 
outsiders, without access to individual loan information, to assess the health of the bank. External auditors  
have access to bank’s individual loans and the banks’ risk management practices.  By validating through 
their audit report, external auditors enrich the information environment, allowing investors to assess bank 
health, and market discipline to work in fostering bank stability.   
IV. Robustness  Checks 
 
To ensure accurate inference and avoid mechanical explanations for the main results so far, I 
provide a series of sensitivity checks in this section.  First, in Table 7, I examine the sensitivity of the 
results to inclusion of variables omitted in the main regressions.  I consider both macro-economic (Panel 
A through C) and institutional variables (Panel D through F). The regression results in all models include 
all explanatory and control variables in the main regression.  To conserve space, I report the coefficients 
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only. 
Economic theory predicts that macro economic shocks that adversely affect the economic 
performance of bank borrowers, whose impacts cannot be diversified away by the banks, would be 
positively related to incidence of crises.  Among these economic shocks, I include in the main regressions 
external terms of trade and inflation. Another variable that may capture adverse macro economic shocks 
that hurt banks via increasing non-performing loans may be the general output downturns related to the 
business cycle.  In Panel A of Table 7, I include a measure of the business cycle, the growth rate in real 
GDP, in the main regression.  The main results that transparency and disclosure reduces crisis probability 
are robust.  Growth in the GDP while having the right sign does not enter significantly. 
Bank profitability is partly a function of the costs of funds the bank pays on its deposits. High 
interest rate could increase the cost of funds for the bank. In addition, high interest rates could increase 
the default rate of bank borrowers, thus reducing the value of bank assets. To control for the banks cost of 
funds, I include the short-term real interest rate in the country in Panel B, in addition to the usual control 
variables.  The main results of the paper that bank transparency and disclosure reduces crisis probability 
remain robust. Real interest rate, while carrying the correct sign in most regressions, does not enter with 
statistical significance. 
The probability of systemic banking crisis can also be affected by the vulnerability of the banking 
system to sudden capital outflows from the country.  In countries particularly with fixed exchange rate 
regimes, a general lack of confidence by foreign investors, or a mismatch of foreign and local rates of 
return on investments, may lead to sudden outflows of foreign capital, which could lead to illiquidity at 
the central bank and banking crisis, when investors convert their local deposits into foreign currency. To 
control for the potential effects of sudden capital outflows, I include as a variable the ratio of M2 to 
foreign exchange reserves in Panel C.  The variable captures the extent to which the liabilities of the 
banking system are backed by international reserves. During currency crisis, investors may rush to 
convert their domestic deposits into foreign currency so that the ratio measures the ability of the central 
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vulnerability to balance of payments crises. The main results of the paper are robust to accounting for this 
variable. Consistent with the theory, external vulnerability as measured by M2 to reserve ratio 
significantly increases crisis probability. 
In addition to macro-economic factors, the main regressions control for the institutional and 
regulatory environments of the banking sector.  As additional robustness, Panel D through F checks for 
the sensitivity of the main results to other institutional features not controlled for in the regressions. Panel 
D controls for the features of countries’ deposit insurance systems.  Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2004) report 
that explicit deposit insurance increases (weakly) banking instability via exasperating the risk-shifting 
incentives of banks. To account for this possibility, I include an indicator variable for explicit deposit 
insurance countries, similar to the way Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2004) did. The results are robust; regulated 
disclosure, and its properties reduce crisis probability, controlling for the design feature of the banking 
safety
7. 
Panel E and Panel F explore the impact of the overall institutional environment of banks and bank 
ownership on bank fragility.  In panel E, we include a variable that captures the general openness and 
competitiveness of the banking system. Consistent with previous findings (e.g., Beck et al., 2005), 
countries with greater freedom in banking are less likely to experience banking crisis.  The main result 
that transparency and disclosure reduces crisis probability is robust.  Panel F accounts for the degree of 
state ownership in banking. Again, the main results are robust to controlling for the ownership structure in 
the banking system. There is weak evidence that extensive government ownership of banks is associated 
with bank fragility.   
In addition to the selection of control variables, the research design and the specification of the 
empirical methodology may influence the reported results. In Table 8, I explore the sensitivity of the 
results to changes in the research design and methodology. First, in the main regression, a crisis event in a 
                                                 
7 The maximum likelihood iterations fail to converge under reasonable boundary conditions for the specification 
under column (1). The result is reported for completeness. 
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means that each country is included eight times in a pooled time-series cross section, and the year in 
which the country was in crisis was coded as a crisis year. Such a design may raise some concerns.  The 
first is that it is very difficult to ascertain the beginning and the end of a crisis episode, and thus the 
designation of a particular year as a crisis year may not be precise.  Second, to the extent that crisis events 
in contagious years may be correlated, the design may introduce a lack of independence in the error 
terms.   In Panel A and Panel B of Table 8, I test for the robustness of the results for alternative 
specifications that address these issues. 
In Panel A, I define the crisis event more broadly so that if a country experiences a banking crisis 
in any year between 1990 and 1997, it is considered as a crisis country for the entire sample period. 
Hence the twenty countries that went through crises were considered as if they experienced crisis in every 
year of the sample period.  Panel A shows that changing the definition of the crisis event in this manner 
does not affect the main results. The effects of greater bank transparency, regulated-disclosure and the 
properties of regulated disclosure, such as intensity, informativeness, timeliness and credibility remain 
negative and highly significant.   
In Panel B, I consider a rather narrow definition of the crisis event in that when the crisis period 
lasts more than a year, I define as the crisis year (event) only the first year of the crisis period and exclude 
the subsequent crisis years from the analysis. Doing so reduces the sample size considerably, but 
alleviates the lack-of-independence problem. It has also an advantage of reducing some reverse causality 
concerns that may arise when a country undergoes multiple years of crisis – the macroeconomic 
environment in the subsequent years during the crisis period may be influenced by the onset of the crisis.  
Dropping the subsequent years entirely reduces this type of reverse causality. The impact of bank 
transparency and regulated-disclosure is unaffected by such a change in the design
8.  Hence, the main 
results of the paper, the inverse relation between bank transparency and fragility, between regulated-
                                                 
8 I also run a cross-sectional specification where each county enters only once as a crisis or no-crisis country. The 
results do not change, though for reasonable parameters the likelihood function fails to converge in some cases. 
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intensity, informativeness, timeliness, and credibility – and bank instability are robust to defining the 
crisis episodes differently.   
In addition to the concerns related to the way the crisis event was defined, it might be argued that, 
because there could be a number of factors that induce banking crisis, the observed result might be a 
reflection of omitted explanatory variables that are correlated with the transparency variables. The 
potential variables are too many to feasibly include; and even if it were feasible, the variables would be 
highly correlated with each other making identification of the effects of any one variable difficult.  The 
main regression controls for the key macro-economic and institutional variables suggested in economic 
theory. Table 7 above controls for additional variables.  However, to effectively address both the potential 
omitted variables and the problem of lack-of-independence in error terms, Panel C estimates the original 
model using a panel data methodology, specifying the latent country-related and time-related sources of 
variations on the dependent variable, crisis, as random effects.  The random-effects panel specification 
has two advantages: (a) it accounts for intra-country and intra-year correlations in the error terms, and (b) 
it properly controls for all other non-observable country-related and time-related sources of crisis 
probability.  The model accounts for any omitted country and time factor.  Panel C shows that banking 
system transparency and its components has robust negative impacts on banking fragility. 
   Finally, the results from the multivariate logistic regression do not explicitly control for the 
potential for endogeneity.  As explained above, I use banking- transparency variables drawn from the 
period after when we observe the countries’ crises experiences.  This may raise a concern that the 
transparency data would reflect the banks’ responses to crises episodes, hence introducing reverse 
causality.  If it is true that a country improves its disclosure after a crisis episode, we would expect an 
occurrence of banking crisis to be followed by improvements in disclosure and transparency – i.e., a 
positive relation between crisis probability and transparency. Yet, our results so far indicate a robust 
negative relation between crisis vulnerability and transparency; hence this type of reverse causality 
appears to be less of a concern. Another form of reverse causality might be the argument that banking 
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bank problems.  I can examine the possibility of both forms of reverse causality using instrumental 
variables to identify the exogenous component of bank transparency and disclosure.   
Based on theory and recent empirical works, I use the legal origin of countries as instruments.  La 
Porta et al. (1998) show that civil law countries tend to support government intervention relative to 
private property rights.  To the extent that disclosure regulations are government sanctions, their 
prevalence and characteristics could be partially dictated by the legal tradition of the country whereas the 
latter has little effect on the probability of crisis.  Legal origin has also been extensively used as an 
instrument in the finance-growth literature (see Levine, 2003) as well as in the banking crises literature 
(see, e.g., Barth et al., 2004).  
I estimate an instrumental variables model with legal origin as instruments.  In the first stage 
regressions, the data does not reject the validity of the instruments. Panel D presents the instrumental 
variables results.  They confirm the major findings in Table 3 through Table 5 that (i) greater bank 
transparency lowers the likelihood of systemic banking crisis; and (ii) greater regulated disclosure quality 
increases the likelihood of banking system stability; and (iii) regulated disclosure that increases disclosure 
intensity, informativeness, timeliness and credibility fosters banking-system stability.  Hence controlling 
for simultaneity via the instruments does not alter the major findings, suggesting that the results are less 
likely to be explained by reverse causality of any form. 
V. Conclusion 
The economic value of mandated accounting disclosure is not well understood.  Reflecting this 
broader debate on the value of disclosure, the role of regulated disclosure to banking system stability is 
also controversial.  While the ‘transparency-stability’ view holds that greater disclosure fosters banking 
system stability through reducing informational asymmetries, the ‘transparency-fragility’ view 
emphasizes the negative externalities that may be associated with greater disclosure and its potential to 
stymie banking system stability.   
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The paper examines the real economic consequences of regulated disclosure – using banking data 
and the incidence of banking system crises as the real economic variable of interest to measure the 
economic value of disclosure.  Based on data on a cross-section of forty-nine countries in the 1990s, the 
paper studies the impacts of increased mandated bank disclosure requirements as reflected in the 
comprehensiveness, informativeness, timeliness and credibility of bank disclosure on the likelihood of 
suffering systemic banking crisis.   
The study documents that mandated disclosure is strongly associated with banking system 
stability. Specifically, the likelihood of systemic banking crisis is lower in countries with regulations that 
require (i) more comprehensive, (ii) more informative, (iii) more timely; and (iv) more credible of bank 
disclosure.  The results are consistent with theories that emphasize informational asymmetry as a rational 
for public regulation of disclosure and those that envision positive externalities from disclosure 
regulations. 
The impact of greater banking disclosure and the consequent transparency to banking stability is 
economically large.  The results indicate that greater disclosure results in significant savings in countries’ 
output loss that is often associated with banking system instability. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
Variable  N Mean  Std  Dev  Minimum  Maximum
Crisis  392 0.170  0.397  0  1.000 
Bank Transparency  232 7.9E-17  1.000  -2.522  1.480 
Regulated Disclosure Quality  360 -2.14E-14  1.000  -2.990  1.259 
Private Information Acquisition  256 11.654  8.141  0  32.400 
Information Dissemination  256 70.763  21.958  23.050  96.720 
Disclosure Intensity  376 0.274  0.869 -1.917  1.342 
Disclosure Informativeness  368 0.009  1.002 -3.505  0.565 
Disclosure Timeliness  256 65.28  25.54 17.39  99.28 
Disclosure Credibility  392 0.024  1.124 -6.725  0.554 
Bank Competition  282 0.653  0.105 0.410  0.920 
Bank Concentration  392 0.715  0.219 0.190  1.000 
External Terms of Trade  383 0.024  0.092 -0.189  0.232 
Log of average Inflation  323 0.115  0.102 0.010  0.460 
Per capita GDP  392 8.428  1.661 5.000  10.779 
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Table 2:  Bank Transparency and Disclosure across Countries 
 
Bank 
Transparency 
Regulated 
Disclosure 
Quality 
Private  
Information.  
Acquisition 
Information. 
Dissemination 
Disclosure 
Intensity 
Disclosure 
Timeliness 
Disclosure 
Informativeness 
Disclosure 
Credibility 
Countries with No Systemic Banking Crisis in 1990 - 1997 
Australia 0.191  -0.431  12.73  68.29  0.083  91.3  -1.593  0.554 
Austria -0.440  -0.675  8.63  87.53  -1.049  68.12  0.564  0.554 
Bahrain .  1.118  .  .  1.342  .  0.565  0.554 
Belgium 0.198  -0.913  15.33  86.73  0.210  63.04  -1.593  0.554 
Botswana .  0.379  .  .  0.210  .  0.565  0.029 
Burundi .  0.972  .  .  1.342  .  0.565  -0.655 
Canada 1.337  1.259  16.9  93.37  1.342  99.28  0.565  0.029 
Chile -0.229  0.511  5.53  62.46  0.210  94.2  0.565  0.554 
Denmark 0.166  0.124  12.87  95.52  0.210  73.91  0.565  0.554 
Egypt .  0.442  .  .  0.210  .  0.565  0.554 
El Salvador  .  0.442  .  .  0.210  .  0.565  0.554 
France 0.627  -0.612  23.2  86.14  0.210  78.26  -1.593  0.554 
Germany 0.861  -0.810  32.4  90.99  0.210  68.12  -1.593  0.554 
Ghana .  -2.008  .  .  -1.917  .  -1.348  0.554 
Greece .  .  6.1  72.07  0.210 17.39  .  0.029 
Guatemala .  -2.178  .  .  -1.917  .  -1.348  -0.655 
Honduras .  -1.276  .  .  -0.658  .  -1.348  0.554 
Ireland 0.006  0.641  5.43  88.34  1.342  69.57  0.565  0.554 
Israel 0.385  0.638  3.19  82.47  1.342  66.67  0.565  -0.131 
Lesotho .  -0.460  .  .  -1.049  .  0.565  -0.655 
Nepal .  .  .  .  .  .  .  0.554 
Pakistan -1.173  0.323  3.4  32.47  0.210  51.45  0.565  0.554 
Philippines -0.167  0.849  10.87  44.26  1.342  75.36  0.565  -0.655 
Portugal -0.456  -0.016  5.33  70.59  0.210  62.32  0.565  -0.655 
Singapore 0.900  0.528  20.9  83.72  1.342  63.77  0.565  0.554 
Switzerland 1.112  0.726  19.97  93.78  1.342  73.91  0.565  0.554 
United 
Kingdom 1.272  1.031  20.1  90.81  1.342  86.96  0.565  -0.131 
United States  1.488  0.582  30.23  96.72  0.210  97.83  0.565  0.554 
Zambia .  0.342  .  .  0.210  .  0.565  0.554 
                
Average 0.358  0.060  14.0616667  79.23667  0.296  72.30333  0.0327  0.2440 
Countries with Systemic Banking Crisis in 1990 - 1997 
Finland 1.049  0.867  14.9  94.82  1.342  78.99  0.565  0.029 
Guyana .  0.346  .  .  0.210  .  0.565  -0.13 
India -1.423  -1.571  11.9  29.51  -0.658  45.65  -1.348  0.131 
Indonesia .  0.368  .  .  0.210  .  0.565  0.554 
Italy 0.773  0.737  21.57  78.98  1.342  86.96  -1.593  -6.725 
Jamaica .  0.442  .  .  0.210  .  0.565  0.554 
Japan 0.977  0.633  14.87  91.79  0.210  86.23  0.565  -3.075 
Jordan .  0.442  .  .  0.210  .  0.565  0.554 
Kenya -2.522  -2.990  0  23.05  -0.658  17.39  -3.506  0.554 
Korea .  .  9.9  83.5  1.341  17.39  .  -0.131 
Malaysia -0.100  -0.054  19.9  63.83  0.210  65.22  0.565  0.554 
Mauritania .  0.442  .  .  0.210  .  0.565  0.554 
Mexico -0.233  -0.297  18.53  59.95  -1.049  84.78  0.565  -0.131 
Nigeria -1.707  -0.924  0  27.29  0.210  17.39  0.565  -0.262 
Peru -0.225  0.074  8.1  40.33  0.210  71.74  0.565  0.554 
Sri Lanka  -0.591  0.724  2.4  37.86  1.342  73.91  0.565  0.554 
Sweden  .  . 20.6  95.47 .  86.23  0.565  0.029 
Thailand -0.238  -0.723  9.77  52.26  -0.658  89.13  -1.348  -0.131 
Turkey -1.381  -1.802  7.97  58.55  0.210  17.39  -1.593  0.554 
Venezuela .  0.442  .  .  0.210  .  0.565  0.554 
               
Average   -0.468  -0.158  11.46  59.80  0.245  59.886  -0.078  -0.243 
Differences 
[p-values of]  0.011
b
0.232 0.193  0.009
a
0.421  0.083
c
0.361  0.077
c
a significant at 1%; 
b significant at 5%; 
c significant at 10% 
 
 
  Crisis  Bank 
Transparency 
Regulated 
Disclosure 
Quality 
Private 
Information 
Acquisition 
Information 
Dissemination 
Disclosure 
Intensity 
Disclosure 
Informativeness 
Disclosure 
Timeliness 
Disclosure 
Credibility 
Bank 
Concentration 
Bank 
Competition 
External 
Terms of 
Trade  
Inflation  
Bank Transparency 
 
-0.124 
(0.056) 
                  
Regulated 
Disclosure Quality 
-0.059 
(0.361) 
0.813 
(<.0001) 
                  
Private Information 
Acquisition 
0.016 
(0.777) 
0.858 
(<.0001) 
0.457 
(<.0001) 
                  
Information 
Dissemination 
-0.084 
(0.144) 
0.829 
(<.0001) 
0.553 
(<.0001) 
0.630 
(<.0001) 
               
Disclosure 
Intensity 
-0.0073 
(0.8885) 
0.601 
(<.0001) 
0.779 
(<.0001) 
0.315 
(<.0001) 
0.402 
(<.0001) 
            
Disclosure 
Informativeness 
-0.0286 
(0.888) 
0.351 
(<.0001) 
0.640 
(<.0001) 
0.062 
(0.323) 
0.308 
(<.0001) 
0.1229 
(0.018) 
           
Disclosure 
Timeliness 
-0.0054 
(0.575) 
0.803 
(<.0001) 
0.756 
(<.0001) 
0.575 
(<.0001) 
0.443 
(<.0001) 
0.2719 
(0.0001) 
0.3704 
(0.0001) 
         
Disclosure 
Credibility 
-0.2667 
(<0.0001) 
-0.217 
(0.001) 
0.280 
(<.0001) 
-0.069 
(0.254) 
-0.099 
(0.101) 
--0.084 
(0.073) 
0.1387 
(0.0058) 
-0.1837 
(0.002) 
        
Bank 
Concentration 
0.0537 
(0.2041) 
-0.100 
(0.121) 
0.011 
(0.863) 
-0.117 
(0.041) 
0.071 
(0.217) 
0.05404 
(0.2999) 
0.3231 
(0.0001) 
-0.0844 
(0.1416) 
0.29267 
(<.0001) 
      
Bank Competition  -0.2634 
(<.0001) 
0.163 
(0.022) 
0.157 
(0.027) 
0.093 
(0.160) 
0.060 
(0.361) 
0.00250 
(0.9709) 
0.1854 
(0.005) 
0.0866 
(0.1966) 
0.15144 
(0.0234) 
0.41617 
(<.0001) 
    
External Terms of 
Trade 
0.02583 
(0.6144) 
-0.569 
(<.0001) 
-0.490 
(<.0001) 
-0.276 
(<.0001) 
-0.459 
(<.0001) 
-0.30211 
(<.0001) 
-0.2734 
(0.0001) 
-0.1448 
(0.0153) 
0.03622 
(0.5293) 
-0.06772 
(0.1860) 
-0.01916 
(0.7755) 
  
Inflation 0.01597 
(0.7432) 
-0.094 
(0.316) 
-0.120 
(0.198) 
-0.134 
(0.105) 
-0.227 
(0.006) 
-0.37016 
(<.0001) 
-0.0925 
(0.1118) 
-0.5021 
(0.0001) 
0.20828 
(0.0002) 
0.09893 
(0.0420) 
0.29594 
(<.0001) 
-0.01223 
(0.8153) 
 
Per Capita GDP  -0.13094 
(0.0069) 
0.809 
(<.0001) 
0.546 
(<.0001) 
0.611 
(<.0001) 
0.962 
(<.0001) 
0.42028 
(<.0001) 
0.1527 
(0.0024) 
0.48889 
(0.0001) 
-0.12436 
(0.0110) 
-0.25521 
(<.0001) 
-0.05737 
(0.3844) 
-0.30561 
(<.0001) 
-0.52670 
(<.0001) 
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Table 3: Correlations   34
                 
 
 
Table 4: Bank Transparency & Banking System Crisis 
The estimated coefficients are parameter estimates of multivariate logistic models. The dependent variable is an indicator variable, crisis, that takes on the value one if there is a systemic banking crisis and the value zero otherwise. Bank transparency is a  
measure of the availability of bank-specific information to decision makers outside the bank. Its values are the principal component of (i) regulated disclosure quality, (ii) private information acquisition, and (iii) information dissemination.  Bank Concentration  
is a measure of concentration in the banking industry, calculated as the fraction of assets held by the three largest banks in each country averaged over the sample period. Bank Competition is a measure of degree of competitive conduct in the banking industry,  
calculated as the sum of elasticity of bank revenue to changes in input prices from Claessens and Laeven (2004). External Terms of Trade is the logarithm of the ratio of export price index to import price index for a country.  Inflation is the logarithm of  
average inflation rate. Restriction on bank activity is a measure that indicates whether bank activities in the securities, insurance, and real estate markets, and ownership and control of non-financial firms. Fraction of Bank Applicants Denied Entry is the 
number of applications to enter the bank market denied as a fraction of the number of applications received from domestic and foreign banks. Per capita GDP is the logarithm of real per capita GDP.  Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors. The sample 
period is 1990 through 1997. Detailed variable definitions are given in Appendix II. 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Bank 
Transparency 
-0.315
b 
(0.166) 
 
-0.574
b 
(0.280) 
 
-0.314
c 
(0.178) 
 
-0.537
b 
(0.210) 
 
-0.721
a 
(0.240) 
 
-0.711
b 
(0.284) 
 
-0.408
b 
(0.161) 
 
-2.137
a 
(0.638) 
 
-1.728
b 
(0.720) 
 
External Terms of 
Trade 
      -6.232
c 
(3.534) 
 
-9.111
a 
(3.481) 
 
2.717 
(2.178) 
 
-25.596
b 
(10.679) 
 
-5.116 
(5.950) 
 
 
Inflation 
         0.544
(1.923) 
 
0.619
(2.137) 
 
2.717 
(2.177) 
 
15.086
a 
(5.672) 
 
15.782
a 
(5.731) 
 
 
Bank 
Concentration 
     -2.389
(1.123) 
 
1.088
c 
(0.6386) 
 
-6.655
a 
(2.185) 
 
-2.550
b 
(1.253) 
 
-5.515
a 
(1.579) 
 
-21.292
a 
(7.241) 
 
-25.362
a 
(8.509) 
 
Bank  
Competition 
          -0.122
(2.517) 
 
-8.566
c 
(5.027) 
 
-5.116 
(5.950) 
 
Restriction on 
Bank Activity 
          0.201
b 
(0.092) 
 
0.294
a 
(0.103) 
 
Fraction of Bank 
Applicants Denied 
Entry 
              -0.693
(0.772) 
 
0.473
(1.020) 
 
 
Per capita GDP 
         - 0 . 4 7 8  
(0.474) 
 
Model χ
2 3.599
c 
(0.058) 
6.938
c 
(0.074) 
17.164
a 
(0.001) 
17.330
a 
(0.001) 
27.329
a 
(<.0001) 
25.286
a 
(0.0001) 
18.723
a 
(0.002) 
61.086
a 
(<.0001) 
62.094
a 
(<.0001) 
%  success                    57.9 61.5 69.5 73.4 76.6 74.1 79.4 91.3 91.8
Pseudo R
2 0.016                  0.040 0.077 0.094 0.152 0.146 0.131 0.464 0.471
a significant at 1%; 
b significant at 5%; 
c significant at 10% 
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Table 5: Bank Reporting Quality, Private Information Acquisition, Information Dissemination & Banking Crisis 
The estimated coefficients are parameter estimates of multivariate logistic models. The dependent variables is an indicator variable, crisis, that takes on the value one of there is a systemic banking crisis and the value zero otherwise. Regulated-disclosure 
quality is a measure of the extent to which regulations governing bank disclosure enhance the quality of bank reporting. It measures the degree to which the disclosure regulations have provisions that increase the comprehensiveness, informativeness, 
timeliness and credibility of the bank financial reports.  Its values are the principal component of (i) disclosure intensity, (ii) disclosure informativeness, (iii) disclosure timeliness, and (iv) disclosure credibility. Private information acquisition is a measure of 
the degree of private information gathering and processing activities by investors or on behalf of investors other than the reporting banks.  Its values are the average number of analysts following a bank in the country. Information dissemination is a measure 
of the extent of dissemination of firm-specific information in the economy.  Its value is the average rank of countries’ per capita number of newspapers and televisions from Bushman et al (2003). Bank Concentration is a measure of concentration in the 
banking industry, calculated as the fraction of assets held by the three largest banks in each country averaged over the sample period. Bank Competition is a measure of degree of competitive conduct in the banking industry, calculated as the sum of 
elasticity of bank revenue to changes in input prices from Claessens and Laeven (2004). External Terms of Trade is the logarithm of the ratio of export price index to import price index for a country.  Inflation is the logarithm of average inflation rate.    Per 
capita GDP is the logarithm of real per capita GDP.  Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors. The sample period is 1990 through 1997. Detailed variable 
definitions are given in Appendix II. 
  Panel A  Panel B  Panel C 
 
  1          2  3 4 5 6 7 8
Regulated-
Disclosure 
Quality 
-0.503
b 
(0.238) 
 
-0.505
b 
(0.216) 
 
-2.893
a 
(0.788) 
 
-6.638
a 
(2.435) 
 
    
Information 
Acquisition 
           -0.115
(0.261) 
 
-0.190 
(0.206) 
 
Information 
Dissemination 
           -0.005
(0.011) 
 
-2.006
a 
(0.682) 
 
External Terms of 
Trade 
-6.004
c 
(3.442) 
 
 -30.538
a 
(10.933) 
 
-58.815
a 
(21.407) 
 
-0.950 
(3.708) 
 
-2.768 
(3.715) 
 
-0.989 
(3.697) 
 
-3.990 
(3.726) 
 
Inflation      1.279
(1.740) 
 
15.242
a 
(4.913) 
 
30.668
b 
(11.981) 
 
6.175
b 
(2.218) 
 
5.288
b 
(2.390) 
 
6.661
b 
(2.681) 
 
9.326
a 
(2.820) 
 
Bank 
Concentration 
 -5.297
a 
(1.921) 
 
-14.946
a 
(4.511) 
 
-7.413
b 
(3.570) 
 
-0.888 
(1.512) 
 
-1.407 
(1.656) 
 
-1.008 
(1.471) 
 
-1.117 
(1.547) 
 
Bank Competition    -0.883 
(2.429) 
 
-16.946
b 
(7.152) 
 
-48.559
b 
(20.322) 
 
-11.206
a 
(3.116) 
 
-10.178
a 
(3.058) 
 
-11.500
a 
(3.105) 
 
-13.183
a 
(3.293) 
 
Per capita GDP        2.056 
(1.138) 
 
     0.094
(0.338) 
 
0.126
a 
(0.045) 
 
Model χ
2 7.070
c 
(0.070) 
22.711
a 
(<.0001) 
73.373
a 
(<.0001) 
76.929
a 
(<.0001) 
29.870
a 
(<.0001) 
31.310
a 
(<.0001) 
29.864
a 
(<.0001) 
43.469
a 
(<.0001) 
%  success                  59.1 73.6 94.3 94.8 81.9 81.1 81.9 89.7
Pseudo R
2 0.041                0.127 0.557 0.584 0.192 0.208 0.192 0.288
a significant at 1%; 
b significant at 5%; 
c significant at 10% 
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       Table 6: Disclosure Intensity, Informativeness, Timeliness, Credibility 
and Banking Crises 
The estimated coefficients are parameter estimates of multivariate logistic models. The dependent variable is an indicator variable, crisis, that takes on the value 
one if there is a systemic banking crisis and the value zero otherwise. Disclosure intensity is a measure of the extent and comprehensiveness of financial reporting 
required of banks.  Its values are the principal component of four indicator variables: (i)  Presentation of Non-Performing Loans - a variable that takes 1 if bank 
regulation requires that accrued income on non-performing loans should not be reported; (ii) Reporting Consolidated Financial Statements - a variable that takes 1 
if consolidated financial statements of bank and non-bank subsidiaries are required; (iii) Reporting Off-Balance-Sheet  to the Public - a variable that takes 1 if off 
balance sheet items are required to be disclosed to the public; and (iv) Reporting Risk Management Practice -  a variable that takes 1 if banks are required to 
disclose risk management practices to the public. Disclosure informativeness is a measure of the degree to which bank disclosure accurately represents banks’ 
financial condition. Its values are the principal components of the indicator variables in (i) and (ii) above. Disclosure timeliness is a measure of the bank disclosure 
is made on timely basis. Its value is an index of the average frequency and comprehensiveness of interim financial reports. Disclosure credibility is a measure of 
the degree to which external audits are independent, professional and rigorous as reflected in bank regulations governing audit practices.  Bank Concentration is a 
measure of concentration in the banking industry, calculated as the fraction of assets held by the three largest banks in each country averaged over the sample 
period. Bank Competition is a measure of degree of competitive conduct in the banking industry, calculated as the sum of elasticity of bank revenue to changes in 
input prices from Claessens and Laeven (2004). External Terms of Trade is the logarithm of the ratio of export price index to import price index for a country.  
Inflation is the logarithm of average inflation rate.  Per capita GDP is the logarithm of real per capita GDP.  Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors. The sample 
period is 1990 through 1997. Detailed variable definitions are given in Appendix II. 
  1  2 3 4 
 
Bank Concentration  -8.095
b 
(3.212) 
 
-13.276
a 
(4.372) 
 
-1.927 
(1.592) 
 
-19.342
b 
(7.809) 
 
Bank Completion  -19.735
a 
(7.188) 
 
-9.634
a 
(3.195) 
 
-11.455
a 
(3.443) 
 
-10.806
a 
(3.933) 
 
External Terms of Trade  -23.229
a 
(6.280) 
 
-13.972
a 
(4.098) 
 
-5.130 
(4.292) 
 
-6.652
c 
(3.500) 
 
Inflation 12.688
a 
(4.517) 
 
14.255
a 
(4.436) 
 
5.511
b 
(2.531) 
 
20.377
a 
(7.601) 
 
Disclosure Intensity  -4.219
a 
(1.129) 
 
   
Disclosure Informativeness    -0.826
b 
(0.424) 
 
  
Disclosure Timeliness      -0.025
c 
(0.014) 
 
 
Disclosure Credibility        -0.985
a 
(0.372) 
 
 
Per Capita GDP 
-0.263 
(0.263) 
 
-0.491
b 
(0.253) 
 
0.045 
(0.206) 
 
-1.449
a 
(0.538) 
 
Model χ
2 92.880
a 
(<.0001) 
68.846
a 
(<.0001) 
34.379
a 
(<.0001) 
76.378
a 
(<.0001) 
%  success  94.7  91.4 80.9 91.2 
Pseudo R
2 0.579  0.437 0.228 0.476 
a significant at 1%; 
b significant at 5%; 
c significant at 10% 
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Table 7: Robustness Tests: Additional Controls 
The estimated coefficients are parameter estimates of multivariate logistic models. The dependent variable is an indicator variable, crisis, that takes on the value one if there is a systemic banking crisis and the value zero otherwise. The full regression also 
 includes Bank Concentration, Bank Competition, External Terms of Trade, Inflation, and Per capita GDP in addition to the variables in the table. GDP growth is the rate of growth of real GDP. Real interest rate is the difference between nominal interest rate and 
 inflation. M2/foreign reserve ratio is M2 divided by the amount of country’s international reserves.   Explicit Deposit Insurance is an indicator variable that takes the value one if the country has an explicit deposit fixed-premium deposit insurance scheme and the  
value zero otherwise. Bank Freedom is an indicator of the relative openness of the banking and financial system. State Ownership is the percentage of banking system’s assets in banks that are 50 percent or more government owned. Bank transparency is a measure  
of the availability of bank-specific information to decision makers outside the bank. Its values are the principal component of (i) regulated disclosure quality, (ii) private information acquisition, and (iii) information dissemination.  Regulated-disclosure quality is a  
measure of the extent to which regulations governing bank disclosure enhance the quality of bank reporting. It measures the degree to which the disclosure regulations have provisions that increase the comprehensiveness, informativeness, timeliness and credibility  
of the bank financial reports.  Its values are the principal component of (i) disclosure intensity, (ii) disclosure informativeness, (iii) disclosure timeliness, and (iv) disclosure credibility. Private information acquisition is a measure of the degree of private information  
gathering and processing activities by investors or on behalf of investors other than the reporting banks.  Its values are the average number of analysts following a bank in the country. Information dissemination is a measure of the extent of dissemination of firm-specific  
information in the economy.  Its value is the average rank of countries’ per capita number of newspapers and televisions from Bushman et al. (2003).  Disclosure intensity is a measure of the extent and comprehensiveness of financial reporting required of banks.   
Its values are the principal component of four indicator variables: (i)  Presentation of Non-Performing Loans - a variable that takes 1 if bank regulation requires that accrued income on non-performing loans should not be reported; (ii) Reporting Consolidated Financial  
Statements - a variable that takes 1 if consolidated financial statements of bank and non-bank subsidiaries are required; (iii) Reporting Off-Balance-Sheet  to the Public - a variable that takes 1 if off balance sheet items are required to be disclosed to the public; and  
(iv) Reporting Risk Management Practice -  a variable that takes 1 if banks are required to disclose risk management practices to the public. Disclosure informativeness is a measure of the degree to which bank disclosure accurately represents banks’ financial condition.  
Its values are the principal components of the indicator variables in (i) and (ii) above. Disclosure timeliness is a measure of the bank disclosure is made on timely basis. Its value is an index of the average frequency and comprehensiveness of interim financial reports.  
Disclosure credibility is a  measure of the degree to which external audits are independent, professional and rigorous as reflected in bank regulations governing audit practices. Bank Concentration is a measure of concentration in the banking industry,  
calculated as the fraction of assets held by the three largest banks in each country averaged over the sample period. Bank Competition is a measure of degree of competitive conduct in the banking industry, calculated as the sum of elasticity of bank revenue  
to changes in input prices from Cleassons and Laeven (2004). External Terms of Trade is the logarithm of the ratio of export price index to import price index for a country.  Inflation is the logarithm of average inflation rate.  Per capita GDP is the logarithm  
of real per capita GDP.  Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors. The sample period is 1990 through 1997. Detailed variable definitions are given in Appendix II. 
Controls for Macro Economic Environment 
  Panel A  Panel B  Panel C 
  1                                    2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
 
14 15 16 17 18
GDP growth  -0.301
(0.701) 
 
0.005
(0.158) 
 
-0.736
(0.589) 
 
-0.442
 c
(0.248) 
 
-0.353 
(0.936) 
 
-0.391
c
(0.057) 
 
                   
Real Interest Rate              -0.104 
(0.094) 
 
0.009
(0.066) 
 
-0.008
(0.081) 
 
-0.402
(0.274) 
 
0.034
(0.204) 
 
-0.266
(0.187) 
 
       
M2/Foreign Reserve Ratio                          0.166
 a
(7.600) 
 
0.150
a 
(0.002) 
 
0.071
(0.045) 
 
0.103
(0.104) 
 
0.182
b 
(0.067) 
 
-0.005
(0.055) 
 
Bank Transparency  -6.635
 b 
(2.702) 
 
                   -2.176
b 
(0.922) 
 
   -1.238
a 
(0.475) 
 
  
Regulated-Disclosure Quality    -0.829
a 
(0.314) 
 
                   -1.089
b 
(0.501) 
 
   -0.762
b 
(0.312) 
 
Disclosure Intensity      -5.416
a 
(1.486) 
 
                 -4.561
b 
(1.797) 
 
   -1.337
a 
(1.229) 
 
Disclosure Informativeness        -1.288
 a
(0.477) 
 
              -2.985
c 
(1.775) 
 
-0.358
(0.236) 
 
  
Disclosure Timeliness          -0.220
c 
(0.124) 
 
            -0.143
b 
(0.069) 
 
   -0.072
a 
(0.020) 
 
 
Disclosure Credibility            -0.791
 b 
(0.349) 
 
                -0.760
b 
(0.343) 
 
-0.768
a 
(0.321) 
 
Controls for Institutional Environment 
  Panel D  Panel E  Panel F 
Explicit Deposit Insurance  25.854 
(272.6) 
 
7.703 
(27.97) 
 
1.730 
(1.690) 
 
1.9162
c 
(1.0308) 
 
13.916 
(26.50) 
 
1.1975 
(0.8731) 
 
                   
Bank Freedom              -2.578
 a
(0.839) 
 
-2.027
 a 
(0.605) 
 
-1.828
a 
(0.490) 
 
-2.225
 a 
(0.495) 
 
-4.623
a 
(1.457) 
 
-1.814
a 
(0.479) 
 
       
State Ownership of Banks                          2.927
 c
(1.605) 
1.124 
(1.799) 
2.230 
(1.803) 
4.750
 b
(1.891) 
2.864
c
(1.481) 
4.035
 b
(1.722) 
Bank Transparency  -14.011
a 
(6.1438) 
                   -1.761
 a 
(0.654) 
 
   -1.581
b
(0.635) 
  
Regulated-Disclosure Quality    -9.688
b 
(4.932) 
 
                   -0.933
 a 
(0.358) 
 
   -2.300
a 
(0.616) 
 
Disclosure Intensity      -3.482
a 
(1.139) 
 
                 -1.511
a 
(0.577) 
 
   -1.210
 b 
(0.496) 
 
Disclosure Informativeness        -0.6966 
(0.4466) 
 
                -0.282
(0.289) 
 
-0.599
(0.618) 
 
  
Disclosure Timeliness          -0.032
b 
(0.015) 
 
            -0.137
a 
(0.037) 
 
   -0.062
a 
(0.015) 
 
 
Disclosure Credibility            -0.777
b 
(0.387) 
                -1.176
a 
(0.363) 
 
-0.446
a 
(0.253) 
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Table 8: Robustness Tests: Alternative Design and Methodology 
The estimated coefficients are parameter estimates of multivariate logistic models. The dependent variable is an indicator variable, crisis, that takes on the value one if there is a systemic banking crisis and the value zero otherwise. Bank transparency is 
a measure of the availability of bank-specific information to decision makers outside the bank. Its values are the principal component of (i) regulated disclosure quality, (ii) private information acquisition, and (iii) information dissemination.   
Regulated-disclosure quality is a measure of the extent to which regulations governing bank disclosure enhance the quality of bank reporting. It measures the degree to which the disclosure regulations have provisions that increase the comprehensiveness,  
informativeness, timeliness and credibility of the bank financial reports.  Its values are the principal component of (i) disclosure intensity, (ii) disclosure informativeness, (iii) disclosure timeliness, and (iv) disclosure credibility. Private information  
acquisition is a measure of the degree of private information gathering and processing activities by investors or on behalf of investors other than the reporting banks.  Its values are the average number of analysts following a bank in the country.  
Information dissemination is a measure of the extent of dissemination of firm-specific information in the economy.  Its value is the average rank of countries’ per capita number of newspapers and televisions from Bushman et al. (2003).  Disclosure  
intensity is a measure of the extent and comprehensiveness of financial reporting required of banks.  Its values are the principal component of four indicator variables: (i)  Presentation of Non-Performing Loans - a variable that takes 1 if bank regulation  
requires that accrued income on non-performing loans should not be reported; (ii) Reporting Consolidated Financial Statements - a variable that takes 1 if consolidated financial statements of bank and non-bank subsidiaries are required; (iii) Reporting  
Off-Balance-Sheet  to the Public - a variable that takes 1 if off balance sheet items are required to be disclosed to the public; and (iv) Reporting Risk Management Practice -  a variable that takes 1 if banks are required to disclose risk management practices  
to the public. Disclosure informativeness is a measure of the degree to which bank disclosure accurately represents banks’ financial condition. Its values are the principal components of the indicator variables in (i) and (ii) above. Disclosure timeliness is  
a measure of the bank disclosure is made on timely basis. Its value is an index of the average frequency and comprehensiveness of interim financial reports. Disclosure credibility is a measure of the degree to which external audits are independent,  
professional and rigorous as reflected in bank regulations governing audit practices. Bank Concentration is a measure of concentration in the banking industry, calculated as the fraction of assets held by the three largest banks in each country averaged  
over the sample period. Bank Competition is a measure of degree of competitive conduct in the banking industry, calculated as the sum of elasticity of bank revenue to changes in input prices from Cleassons and Laeven (2004). External Terms of Trade  
is the logarithm of the ratio of export price index to import price index for a country.  Inflation is the logarithm of average inflation rate. External Audit Stringency is a measure of the degree to which external audits are independent, professional and rigorous  
as reflected in bank regulations governing audit practices. Per capita GDP is the logarithm of real per capita GDP.  The estimates in Panel C are based on panel data methodology with random country and time effects. The estimates in Panel D are estimates  
of two-stage instrumental variables models, where countries’ legal origins are used as instruments. Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors. The sample period is 1990 through 1997. Detailed variable definitions are given in Appendix II. 
 
  Panel A  Panel B  Panel C: Random Effects  Panel D:  Instrumental Variables 
  1                                      2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
 
14 15 16 17 18 19
 
20 
 
21 
 
22 
 
23 
 
24 
 
Bank 
Concentration 
-8.247
a 
(2.754) 
 
-15.007
a 
(4.963) 
 
-2.775
c 
(1.589) 
 
-1.661 
(1.549) 
 
-0.461 
(1.353) 
 
0.410 
(1.913) 
 
-25.661
a 
(9.453) 
 
-7.090
c 
(3.620) 
 
-8.529
b 
(3.453) 
 
-10.34
a 
(3.950) 
 
-6.485
b 
(3.061) 
 
-16.619
b 
(7.488) 
 
-4.232
 a
(2.042) 
 
-3.799
(1.870) 
 
-2.370
(1.583) 
 
-1.063
(2.009) 
 
-4.284
 a
(1.905) 
 
-1.710
(1.703) 
 
-2.162 
(1.531) 
 
-2.162 
(1.531) 
 
-2.162
a 
(9.453) 
 
-2.162
a 
(9.453) 
 
-2.162
a 
(9.453) 
 
-2.162
a 
(9.453) 
 
Bank 
Competition 
6.345
b 
(3.91) 
 
11.824
b 
(4.822) 
 
-5.888
b 
(2.511) 
 
-2.772 
(1.980) 
 
-2.772 
(2.085) 
 
-2.220 
(2.240) 
 
-5.389 
(7.600) 
 
-52.828
b 
(23.370) 
 
-16.119
b 
(6.328) 
 
-7.660
b 
(3.132) 
 
-14.352
b 
(6.788) 
 
-8.904
b 
(4.076) 
 
-4.259 
(3.271) 
 
-1.870
(2.723) 
 
-3.513
(2.293) 
 
-6.514
(2.914) 
 
-4.263 
(3.074) 
 
-4.243
 c 
(2.298) 
 
-16.439
a 
(13.131) 
 
-16.439
a 
(13.131) 
 
-16.439
a 
(13.131) 
 
-16.439
a 
(13.131) 
 
-16.439
a 
(13.131) 
 
-16.439
a 
(13.131) 
 
External Terms 
of Trade 
5.044 
(2.985) 
 
6.726 
(4.007) 
 
-5.724
b 
(2.855) 
 
1.034 
(2.169) 
 
12.567
a 
(3.204) 
 
2.920 
(2.195) 
 
-33.538
b 
(13.428) 
 
-70.237
a 
(26.674) 
 
-24.653
a 
(6.655) 
 
-13.96
a 
(4.145) 
 
-21.02
b 
(8.389) 
 
-5.876
c 
(3.444) 
 
-5.440 
(4.215) 
 
-5.780
(3.809) 
 
-7.977
 a 
(2.955) 
 
-7.571
(3.251) 
 
-2.292 
(3.719) 
-5.475
 c 
(2.846) 
 
-2.602 
(3.025) 
 
-2.602 
(3.025) 
 
-2.602 
(3.025) 
 
-2.602 
(3.025) 
 
-2.602 
(3.025) 
 
-2.602 
(3.025) 
 
Inflation 
 
1.999 
(2.910) 
 
-4.978 
(5.385) 
 
-3.289 
(2.898) 
 
-0.212 
(2.028) 
 
-1.987 
(2.776) 
 
1.152 
(2.105) 
 
12.516
b 
(6.255) 
 
30.097
b 
(12.985) 
 
9.076
c 
(4.662) 
 
10.291
b 
(4.061) 
 
5.069 
(4.365) 
 
18.293
b 
(7.382) 
 
3.413 
(3.088) 
 
1.955
(2.844) 
 
1.179
(2.272) 
 
0.897
(3.490) 
 
3.564 
(2.897) 
 
2.814 
(2.694) 
 
4.646
c 
(2.435) 
 
4.646
c 
(2.435) 
 
4.646
c 
(2.435) 
 
4.646
c 
(2.435) 
 
4.646
c 
(2.435) 
 
4.646
c 
(2.435) 
 
Bank 
Transparency 
-1.025
a 
(0.405) 
 
                          -3.012
a 
(0.994) 
 
-0.753
b 
(0.310) 
   -72.422
b 
(30.101) 
 
Regulated-
Disclosure 
Quality 
                      -1.702
a 
(0.403) 
 
   -8.103
b 
(3.236) 
 
   -0.481
b 
(0.206) 
 
-46.046
b 
(19.138) 
 
    
Disclosure 
Intensity 
                        -2.564
a 
(0.489) 
 
-4.701
a 
(1.229) 
 
   -0.583
b 
(0.238) 
 
   -3.320
b 
(1..380) 
 
Disclosure 
Informativeness 
                           0.087
(0.166) 
 
-0.743
c 
(0.407) 
 
   -0.212
(0.273) 
 
-83.73
b 
(34.805) 
 
  
Disclosure 
Timeliness 
                        . 0 3 3 -0.022
b 
(0.010) 
 
-0.086
a 
(0.025) 
 
   -0.023
b 
(0.010) 
 
- 0
b 
(0.014) 
 
 
Disclosure 
Credibility 
                             -1.334
a 
(0.303) 
 
-1.430
a 
(0.427) 
 
-0.494
b 
(0.224) 
 
-10.163
b 
(4.224) 
 
Per capita GDP  -0.434
c 
(0.252) 
 
-0.845
a 
(0.303) 
 
-0.823
a 
(0.191) 
 
-0.758
a 
(0.166) 
 
-0.368
b 
(0.175) 
 
-0.949
a 
(0.175) 
 
-0.041 
(0.561) 
 
2.569
c 
(1.458) 
 
-0.326 
(0.270) 
 
-0.524
b 
(0.239) 
 
-0.034 
(0.281) 
 
-1.653
a 
(0.549) 
 
0.4120
(0.175) 
 
-0.083 
(0.230) 
 
-0.1877 
(0.178) 
 
-0.277
(0.344) 
 
0.186 
(0.361) 
 
-0.250 
(0.179 
-0.601
a 
(0.207) 
 
-0.601
a 
(0.207) 
 
-0.601
a 
(0.207) 
 
-0.601
a 
(0.207) 
 
-0.601
a 
(0.207) 
 
-0.601
a 
(0.207) 
 
Model χ
2 62.401
a 
(<.0001) 
85.058
 a
(<.0001) 
94.567
 a
(<.0001) 
46.188
 a
(<.0001) 
52.602
 a
(<.0001) 
75.697
 a 
(<.0001) 
58.263
 a
(<.0001) 
68.400
 a
(<.0001) 
84.537
 a
(<.0001) 
56.078
 a
(<.001) 
49.879
 a
(<.0001) 
71.402
 a
(<.0001) 
NA NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  52.327
 a
(<.0001) 
52.327
 a
(<.0001) 
58.263
 a
(<.0001) 
58.263
 a
(<.0001) 
58.263
 a
(<.0001) 
58.263
 a
(<.0001) 
%  success                                    85.7 88.1 91.1 80.0 83.8 86.6 92.4 94.8 94.2 88.0  91.3  92.2 NA NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  86.3 86.3 86..3 86..3 86..3 86..3
Pseudo R
2 0.319                                      0.435 0.418 0.210 0.239 0.335 0.500 0.587 0.578 0.390 0.400 0.488 NA NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  0.230 0.230 0.230 0.230 0.230 0.230
a significant at 1%; 
b significant at 5%; 
c significant at 10% 
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Appendix I: Systemic Banking Crises in the 1990s 
 
Country  Banking Crisis in 
1990s 
  
Country  Banking Crisis in 
1990s 
Australia   Japan  1992-97 
Austria   Jordan    1990 
Bahrain   Kenya  1993 
Belgium   Korea,  South  1997 
Botswana   Lesotho   
Burundi   Malaysia  1997 
Canada   Mauritania  1990-93 
Chile   Mexico 1994-97 
Denmark   Nepal   
El Salvador    Nigeria  1991-95 
Egypt   Pakistan     
Finland 1991-94  Peru  1990 
France   Philippines   
Germany   Portugal   
Ghana   Singapore   
Greece   Sri  Lanka 1990-93 
Guatemala   Sweden  1990-93 
Guyana 1993-95  Switzerland     
Honduras   Thailand  1997 
India 1991-97  Turkey  1991,  1994 
Indonesia 1992-97 United  Kingdom   
Ireland   U.S.A.   
Israel   Venezuela  1993-97 
Italy 1990-95  Zambia  
Jamaica 1996-97     
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Appendix II: Definition of Main Variables 
 
Variables Definition 
Dependent Variables: 
      
     Crisis   
 
 
 
Indicator variable that takes 1 if a country has undergone systemic banking crisis in the period 1990 through 1997 (Source: 
World Bank (2003)). 
Explanatory Variables: 
 
  Bank Transparency 
 
 
 
   Regulated Disclosure Quality 
 
 
 
 
 
   Private Information Acquisition 
 
 
 
 
   Information Dissemination 
 
 
   Disclosure Intensity 
     
 
 
    
 
 
    Disclosure Informativeness 
 
 
 
    Disclosure Timeliness 
     
      
 
    Disclosure Credibility 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
A measure of the availability of bank-specific information to decision makers outside the bank.  Its values are the principal 
component of (i) regulated disclosure quality, (ii) private information acquisition, and (iii) information dissemination. (see 
below for the sources of each variable) 
 
A measure of the extent to which regulations governing bank disclosure enhance the quality of bank reporting. It measures 
the degree to which the disclosure regulations have provisions that increase the comprehensiveness, informativeness, 
timeliness and credibility of the bank financial reports.  Its values are the principal component of (i) disclosure intensity, (ii) 
disclosure informativeness, (iii) disclosure timeliness, and (iv) disclosure credibility (Source: calculated based on Barth et al. 
(2001)) 
 
A measure of the degree of private information gathering and processing activities by investors or on behalf of investors 
other than the reporting banks.  Its values are the average number of analysts following a bank in the country. It is computed 
as the sum of total number of analysts following each bank divided by the number of banks in the country, and is taken from 
Bushman et al. (2004). 
 
A measure of the extent of dissemination of firm-specific information in the economy.  Its value is the average rank of 
countries’ per capita number of newspapers and televisions from Bushman et al. (2004). 
 
A measure of the extent and comprehensiveness of financial reporting required of banks.  Its values are the principal 
component of four indicator variables: (i)  Presentation of Non-Performing Loans - a variable that takes 1 if bank regulation 
requires that accrued income on non-performing loans should not be reported; (ii) Reporting Consolidated Financial 
Statements - a variable that takes 1 if consolidated financial statements of bank and non-bank subsidiaries are required; (iii) 
Reporting Off-Balance-Sheet  to the Public - a variable that takes 1 if off balance sheet items are required to be disclosed to 
the public; and (iv) Reporting Risk Management Practice -  a variable that takes 1 if banks are required to disclose risk 
management practices to the public (Source: Barth et al. (2001)). 
 
A measure of the degree to which bank disclosure accurately represents banks’ financial condition. Its values are the 
principal components of the indicator variables in (i) and (ii) above 
 
A measure of the bank disclosure is made on timely basis. Its value is an index of the average frequency and 
comprehensiveness of interim financial reports (Source: CIFAR (1995)). 
 
 
A measure of the degree to which external audits are independent, professional and rigorous as reflected in bank regulations 
governing audit practices.  The index is the principal component of five indicator variables:  (i) Compulsory Audit - a 
variable that takes 1 if external audit is compulsory in the country; (ii) Required Extent of Audit - a variable that assumes the 
value 1 if bank regulation sanctions the extent of the external audit; (iii) License Requirements - a variable that takes 1 if 
auditors are required to be licensed or certified; (iv) Auditor Report to Supervisor - a variable that takes 1 if auditors’ report 
should be given to the bank supervisory agency; and (v)Auditor Meet Supervisor without Consent of Bank -  a variable that 
takes 1 if the bank supervisory agency can meet the external auditors to discuss audit report without the consent of the bank 
auditee (Source: Barth et al. (2001)) 
Control Variables:  
 
     Bank Concentration 
 
     
     Bank Competition 
 
 
     Restriction on Bank Activity 
 
 
 
     Fraction of Bank Applicants Denied Entry 
 
 
     External Terms of Trade 
 
     Inflation  
  
     Per capita GDP 
 
    Explicit Deposit Insurance 
 
 
The degree of concentration in the banking industry, measured as share of assets of the three largest banks in the country, 
averaged over the period 1990 through 1997 (constructed from the BankScope database).  
 
The degree of competitive conduct in the banking industry, measured as the sum of elasticity bank revenue to changes in 
input prices from Cleassons and Laeven (2004). 
 
A measure that indicates whether bank activities in the securities, insurance, and real estate markets, and ownership and 
control of non-financial firms are (i) unrestricted, (ii) permitted, (iii) restricted or, (iv) prohibited (Source: Barth et al. 
(2001)) 
 
Number of entry applications denied as a fraction of the number of applications received from domestic and foreign banks. 
(Source: Barth et al. (2001)) 
 
The logarithm of the ratio of export price index to import price index for a country (Source: World Bank (1999)). 
 
The logarithm of the average inflation rates (Source: World Bank (1999)). 
 
The logarithm of real per capita GDP (Source: World Bank (1999)). 
 
An indicator variable that takes 1 if a country has a risk-insensitive deposit insurance safety net; 0 otherwise (Source: 
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2004)). 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Bank Transparency and Banking System Stability 
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